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## STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS: RESTRUCTURING TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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BY

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### US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS: RESTRUCTURING TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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#### **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Gary T. Bublitz (LTC), USAR

TITLE: US Army Reserve Components: Restructuring to Meet the Needs

of the 21st Century

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 15 April 1996 PAGES: 32 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The US military has been operating under the Total Force Policy concept since the end of the Vietnam War. Today, this policy is flawed—not in theory, but in how it is implemented, specifically with regards to the reserve components. The active components must rely on the Reserves both in peacetime and war, because the Reserves have over half of the Army force structure, and because of active component decreases in end strength. This has increased reserve component involvement in all military operations. The Reserves, however, are plagued by numerous problems due to politics and history that degrade readiness. This paper identifies several of these key problems and argues that changes are necessary and inevitable. It offers several revolutionary changes to make the Reserves more viable for the future. Although these changes may be viewed by some as politically unrealistic, the author suggests that not to change is even more unrealistic.

#### CHAPTER 1

#### INTRODUCTION

The current Total Force Policy of the US military is flawed—not in theory, but in how it is implemented. It is flawed because the reserve components are operating in an archaic system which detracts from their combat readiness, thus making them a liability to the active component in a major conflict.

The total force concept was initiated by General Creighton Abrahms, Army Chief of Staff, at the end of the Vietnam War to ensure that America would never again go to war without the Reserves. Abrahms' concept was founded on the premise that the Reserves were "the bridge between the wartime military and the American public." Thus, the Reserves were the ideal instrument to revitalize the "remarkable trinity" of Carl von Clausewitz by "stiffening the congressional backbone" to ensure the active support of Congress, and more importantly, the American people.<sup>1</sup>

Today, the Total Force Policy is further entrenched in US military strategy due to the downsizing of the active component brought on by budget constraints. Since a reserve unit can be funded for 40% to 70% of an active unit,<sup>2</sup> the Reserves are seen as one solution to fewer active duty soldiers. Couple this with the outstanding performance of reserve units and soldiers in Desert Storm and other peacetime missions, and you have a mix that Congress can not pass up. As a result, "virtually every conceivable deployment of any significance today will require the mobilization of at least some reserve component units and/or personnel." "In fact,

the Army probably could not put a force the same size and capability [as that of Desert Storm] on the battlefield today without employing reserve infantry and armor units, which it did not use in Desert Storm."

Unfortunately, the Reserves have numerous problems haunting them, such as inefficient command and control structures, lack of equipment and little or no direct training guidance or supervision from active duty higher headquarters units. Additionally, the Army's three component structure (Active, Reserve and National Guard) produces political infighting over budgets, missions and force structure, leaving the three components suspect and wary of one another.

Politics and history are seen as the reason why our nation, "with an army that is the most technologically advanced in the world, and that has developed the world's most innovative warfighting doctrine, managed to end up with such a cumbersome reserve system." The reserve components today are still organized and managed based upon the National Defense Act of 1933 and the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 which are now outdated. They were suitable for a reserve force necessary to reinforce a much larger active component, and a military strategy that incorporated the use of nuclear weapons in a bipolar world; in other words, when the reserve components were the "forces in reserve."

Today, this organization is a liability and keeps the reserve components from being an efficient and viable force for the future. "Although Congress has thrown more money at the Reserves," and the reserve commands are attempting to tailor force structure and peace time command and control, the "reserve structure is archaic and inefficient." It is inefficient to meet both the increased mission demands and operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the 90's.

Consequently, "if the active Army cannot fight even brush-fire wars without the reserve components, the roles and capabilities of the Reserves are indeed defense policy issues of the first order." As a result, change in the reserve components is a critical necessity, and inevitable.

Given this increased reliance on the reserve components in war, the increased missions and OPTEMPO in peacetime, the structural problems plaguing the reserves, and the inevitability of change, this paper will focus on the changes necessary to make the Reserves a viable and efficient force for the 21st Century. It will first present arguments detailing the need for change by discussing the key areas of command and control, leadership, training and equipment in the context of overall readiness. The final section will address recommendations for the future. Although many of the arguments will be substantiated by other sources, the author's 26 years of service in both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve will serve as a reality check.

#### **CHAPTER 2**

#### INHERENT PROBLEMS

As previously stated, the problems affecting the reserve components fall into several broad categories: command and control, leadership, training and equipment. These problems are interrelated and overlapping, and do not occur isolated from one another. No one problem is seen as more critical than another. Consequently, our discussion will focus on these categories individually, and use overall readiness as the catalyst for change.

#### **Command and Control**

For our discussion, the area of command and control includes three subcategories: administrative control, tactical control and command. By administrative control we are referring to the headquarters that controls a reserve unit in peacetime, and has responsibility for manning, equipping and funding. Tactical control, on the other hand, refers to the headquarters that has responsibility for the unit upon mobilization. Command refers to the actual command of a unit by its commander. Ideally, all three command and control entities should have common goals, and work together toward achieving them.

This is not the case in the reserve components. In the Army Reserve, the administrative control headquarters, the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC)<sup>9</sup> and its subordinate commands, the regional Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM's), are non deploying administrative headquarters with no wartime mission. These headquarters have no formal peacetime command relationship with the active component tactical control

headquarters scheduled to receive subordinate reserve units. These administrative headquarters are not responsible for providing Army Reserve troops to the combatant commands, rather they merely provide troops to the active component. Upon mobilization, "if their troops are ill prepared, [neither] the ARCOM's [nor the USARC] will fail on the battlefield." In contrast, a warfighting commander has the incentive to train his troops in order to ensure his/her own success. <sup>10</sup> The challenge to these reserve headquarters is enormous. They must train a myriad of different units for deployment in multiple theaters, without the benefit of clear guidance from the wartime headquarters.

This lack of clear guidance is reflected in the study by the Reserve Component Training Strategy Task Force (RCTSTF) which found that many reserve units do not prepare mission essential task lists (METL's) because of vague guidance from the Army Reserve higher headquarters. Guidance to develop the METL is non existent or vague because the Reserve headquarters is not in the warfighting chain of command. Consequently, the unit commander does not have sufficient guidance to direct his training.<sup>11</sup> Instead, the Army Reserve headquarters tend to create numerous unnecessary requirements which are often unrelated to readiness. The RCTSTF reported that "the average reserve company commander is burdened with at least 115 administrative requirements annually...and spends one-half of his thirty-nine days of annual scheduled training time complying with these administrative requirements."

The Reserve Forces Policy Board states that this administrative emphasis creates a reserve chain of command

that is insensitive to the negative impacts caused by requirements it imposes on subordinate units. This situation tends to reward administrative prowess rather than effective training. In many cases, unit commanders are more comfortable concentrating on administration and other [readiness] detractors because results are measurable. 13

In July 1994, the Chief of Army Reserve commissioned a study group of five general officers to evaluate the command and control structure of the Army Reserve. Their recommendation was to eliminate the twenty ARCOM's and replace them with ten Regional Support Commands (RSC's) and three Regional Support Groups (RSG's) aligned to the ten Federal Standard Regions. The intent was to streamline pre-mobilization functions, and to expand missions at the command level to support readiness and management.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, it is too early to tell whether this reorganization will have any effect on reducing the administrative burden.

From personal experience, these two task forces are absolutely correct; in fact, they may be a bit conservative. Not only do the commanders get burdened with the administrative requirements, but the full time soldiers, Active Guard and Reserve (AGR's) and technicians, spend the majority of their time preparing and answering these administrative requirements.

The National Guard commander experiences the same type of problems, but instead of the USARC or RSC, it is the State Adjutant General's office that is the administrative control headquarters, again with no tactical control or wartime mission. This is further compounded since there are fifty-four separate Adjutant General's, one for every state and US territory. Consequently, Army National Guard commanders are hampered by state control. Local senior commander's are "powerless to implement their own guidance to subordinate units from different states." Unlike the Reserves though, "the Army's legal authority over the Army National Guard is limited to monitoring and advising," due to peacetime state control of the Guard.

Utah's Adjutant General clearly supports this argument when he states that much of the thirty-nine days "is occupied by the inevitable 'training detractors': administration, inspections, HIV testing, and family support activities. All of these activities are necessary and enhance readiness in their own ways, but their negative effect on training is unarquable."

#### Leadership

Our discussion of leadership will include a look at three different components of reserve leadership: senior officer leadership, preparation for leadership, and the AGR force. Senior leaders are defined as lieutenant colonels and above, and sergeants first class and above.

Many reserve component senior leaders have active component experience, but this was usually gained as a junior officer or junior enlisted. Even though this is invaluable, in most cases, it has little to do with being a senior leader. Senior leadership is learned from senior leaders through mentoring, interaction with one another, and formal and informal training programs. Reserve component senior leaders have little opportunity to learn from their active duty counterparts, since they have little interaction with them. Consequently, most senior reserve leaders are left to their own resources, or to civilian business and industry to learn their craft. Their opportunity to prepare for leadership by attending formal military education comes from either correspondence courses or USAR schools which are taught one weekend per month, or four nights per month. Rarely, does a reserve senior leader attend a resident course such as the Command and General Staff Officer Course or the Army War College, or their equivalents. As a result, the professional military competence of the reserve senior leader is usually less than his active duty counterpart.<sup>18</sup>

Some senior reserve officers, like MG Matthews mentioned earlier, believe that the value of the citizen-soldier is the marriage of military discipline and training with civilian-acquired skills and training. In addition, most Guard and Reserve units contain

experience and maturity levels substantially higher than those of their AC counterparts. This situation cries out for creative ways to fit requirements into civilian schedules.<sup>19</sup>

In my personal experience, I have found that on the whole reserve senior leaders are good mature senior leaders and managers based upon their civilian backgrounds, but they lack military professional knowledge, and consequently remain below that of their active duty counterparts. Additionally, the reserve system does not always allow for the best qualified officer to be selected as commander. Geographical availability of qualified officers and reserve politics often play a greater role in who is selected to command, unlike the active component that selects commanders at battalion and above from a centralized list. In the Army Reserve, a centralized list is utilized only at brigade and above, but consideration for selection is only based upon those officers who apply for the position, usually from the geographic location near the unit.

On the enlisted side, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) concluded that "individual skill qualification is the greatest limiting factor for the Army National Guard, and the second most critical for the Army Reserve." As a result, "more than one-fifth of the soldiers in selected reserve units are unqualified to perform the duties of the positions they hold."

Consequently, "each year about one-quarter of the enlisted personnel who enter the Army National Guard are soldiers with prior active Army combat arms experience who must be retrained" in non combat arms skills. In the Army Reserve, it is a much higher percentage due to the preponderance of combat service support slots. The norm in the reserve components is for enlisted to have more than one military occupational skill (MOS), and for officers to have more than one branch.

The age factor added to skill qualification creates another challenge. In Desert Storm, some of the noncommissioned officers in the 48th Infantry Brigade of the Georgia National

Guard were well over fifty, the brigade's command sergeant major was fifty-four, and another senior noncommissioned officer was fifty-eight.<sup>22</sup> These soldiers are not too old to contribute, but they are too old for combat units. In my experience, it is not necessarily the age that limits, but rather the physical condition of the soldier. Physical fitness in the reserves is far below that of the active component.

Looking at the AGR program, we see several problems, "the most obvious is the shortage of full-time support personnel. As of the end of FY 92, only 70 percent of required Army National Guard full-time support billets were filled, and only 71 percent of the Army Reserve slots were filled." The positions that are filled are predominately administrative and managerial positions. Since Title 10 precludes AGR officers from commanding units, the AGR officer many times occupies positions for which command is a requirement in the active component. Additionally, it is not uncommon to see reservists with more relevant active component and command experience as compared to the AGR soldier.

Since AGR soldiers are the commanders day-to-day work force, commanders tend to expect more from the AGR soldier than from the reservist. Prior to 1982-83, AGR soldiers were double slotted with reservists, thus allowing the reservist to take a back seat to the detriment of unit readiness. Although AGR's are no longer double slotted, many reservists still take a back seat to the more knowledgeable AGR soldier. In my experience, the more proficient the AGR soldier, the less proficient the reservist; because the reservist always knows that no matter how poorly he accomplishes his job, or whether he finishes his job or not, the AGR soldier will always be there to ensure that the unit does not fail.

The bottom line in the leadership arena is that the quality of reserve leadership, as in the active component, is directly related to the state of reserve readiness.<sup>24</sup>

#### **Training**

Despite the significant changes in the art of warfare, reserve training is virtually the same as it was twenty-six years ago when I joined the Reserves. The typical reserve unit drills one weekend per month with one two-week annual training period, for a total of thirty-nine days per year. Selected units, based upon their mobilization priority, receive additional training assemblies; however, except only in special circumstances, the time the soldiers spend in these assemblies is usually devoted to "planning and administering, not training. Unit training is scheduled for only the designated thirty-nine days."

The effectiveness of the weekend training assembly is limited due to travel distances from training areas. The average reserve unit must travel 40.1 miles to the nearest local training area to perform small unit training, 65.7 miles to the nearest rifle range, and 154.2 miles to the nearest major training area to have the same facilities an active duty unit has at home post. Additionally, a reserve unit must travel an average of 128.5 miles just to get to their major equipment.<sup>26</sup>

Time is another key factor in weekend training. A few years ago, a reserve officer, studying effective use of training time, concluded that of the thirty-four hours available in a typical weekend, only eighteen were usable for training, and then only if training was around the clock.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, the combined effect of travel to training areas and time available to train can produce a significant hurdle to meaningful training.

As if this weekend scenario was not bad enough, "reserve units often use the time they have inefficiently." During annual training, many reserve brigades and divisions spend a large part of their time in large-scale exercises. This is often conducted at the expense of individual training.<sup>28</sup> Fortunately, many high priority units in the Army Reserve are now on a biannual LANES<sup>29</sup> training schedule. Unfortunately, the Army Reserve Training Divisions are tasked with overall planning and evaluation, and utilize reserve officers in evaluation roles with little active component involvement. This is extremely time intensive and there is insufficient time to have all reserve units participate, thus leaving a gap in training.

As we mentioned earlier, defense budgets are shrinking; as a result, the Army Reserve has gone to a tiered resourcing<sup>30</sup> concept. This was designed as a short term solution as it creates a tiered readiness structure. Units that receive the priority funding have a better chance of maintaining overall readiness<sup>31</sup>, while those on the bottom must struggle to survive. The Chief of Army Reserve, stated in a briefing in May 1995, that all reserve units must be funded to maintain at least a C-3 level of readiness.<sup>32</sup> Again, this sounds great, but in actuality, non CFP units received little or no funding until year end dollars became available late in the FY when it was too late to affect training.<sup>33</sup>

During Desert Storm, many reserve units used key postmobilization training time to accomplish tasks that should have been done prior to mobilization.<sup>34</sup> As a result, some unit commanders downgraded their unit's subjective ratings to C-4 upon mobilization. According to Jeffrey Jacobs, this was because "the commanders inflated their original subjective assessments of the state of their units' training," which proved the assertion made by the Congressional Budget Office "that training ratings have an optimistic bias, reflecting the reserve unit commander's 'can do' attitude as much as his unit's readiness." In my

experience, I saw ARCOM staff upgrade Unit Status Report (USR) ratings on the subjective opinion that key required equipment and personnel fills would be available upon mobilization.

These changes were made against the recommendation of the unit's battalion commander.<sup>37</sup>

Training is the key to readiness. Without adequate training time, an efficient training program and funding to match, no unit can be ready to go to war.

#### **Equipment**

In an era of high technology, effective training is only as good as the availability of modern equipment. At the end of FY 92, the Army National Guard had only 75 per cent if its required equipment on hand (EOH), and the Army Reserve had only 66 per cent on hand. Since then, EOH rates have risen to 98 per cent for the Army National Guard and 88 per cent for the Army Reserve. These figures include both excess and substitute equipment; figures for required equipment only, without the excesses and substitute equipment, would be considerably lower, and clearly below that of the active component. Major equipment shortages in the Army National Guard include: 5-ton tractor and cargo vehicles, 10-ton trucks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, NBC equipment, night vision goggles, communications equipment and combat support and combat service support equipment. Shortages for the Army Reserve include: 1 1/4-ton utility vehicles, 2 1/2- and 5-ton cargo vehicles, radio and telephone equipment, night vision goggles, NBC equipment, 10-ton trucks, and combat support and combat service support equipment.

Obsolete and incompatible equipment (compared with active component equipment)
remains in the reserve inventory, despite modification and conversion programs within the
Total Force. Incompatible and obsolete equipment in the Army National Guard includes: older

versions of the armored personnel carriers, VRC-12 Series Radios, gasoline powered tactical trucks and generators, and bulldozers. In the Army Reserve, incompatible and obsolete equipment includes: VRC-12 Series Radios, gasoline powered generators, older series 2 1/2-and 5-ton tactical trucks, and older series 10-ton tractors.<sup>41</sup>

Adding to this problem is the organizational maintenance backlog and the unfunded depot maintenance requirements. Throughout FY 94, the Army Reserve organizational maintenance backlog averaged approximately 35 days, despite consolidation of area maintenance support activities (AMSA's), which allowed the Reserve to reduce overhead while increasing the number of mechanics in each facility. The unfunded depot maintenance requirements are increasing drastically. In FY 93, unfunded maintenance in the Reserve was \$1.3 million. In FY 94 this grew to \$52.3 million dollars, with a projection of \$36.7 million in FY 95. The majority of this backlog is due to transfers of equipment from the active component to the reserve component. It affects such equipment as construction and engineer equipment, communications-electronics equipment, and watercraft vehicles. 42

It is very difficult to expect a unit to be proficient and well trained with equipment shortages, obsolete and incompatible equipment, and organizational and depot maintenance backlogs as are present in the Reserves today. Reserve forces must be trained on the most modern equipment, and especially compatible equipment, if expected to perform their wartime mission on short notice.

#### Overall Readiness

"FY 94 was a low point for reserve component equipment and personnel because of significant reductions in those categories during FY 92 to FY 94." Consequently, overall

reserve readiness suffered at a time when the active component began to rely more and more on the Reserves. The strategy of tiered resourcing improved readiness for those units so affected. Priority units "received 115 percent of their authorized full-time support, 100 percent of their authorized equipment, and priority for training, maintenance, force modernization, and recruiting. This program has increased readiness levels by 28 percent since October 1992."

Although, this appears to solve the immediate problem of keeping first-to-fight units mobilization ready, it is quickly becoming a major readiness issue for the remainder of the reserve units not in a priority status.

There is little doubt that the reserve components are vital to this nation's military readiness. The challenge under the Total Force Policy is how to maintain a technologically advanced active component with state of the art equipment, while at the same time, maintain the reserve components at a state of readiness that will allow their timely mobilization. Based upon the arguments presented, it is clear to me that the Total Force Policy designed to accomplish this objective is flawed and has failed to do the job. As a result, critical change is needed to enhance this Total Force Policy.

#### **CHAPTER 3**

#### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

Change in any organization is inevitable. As for the Reserves, change is a critical necessity in order to meet the needs of the US Military's Total Force for the 21st Century. The following recommendations are a combination of the writer's views and those of other's which the writer views as necessary for the future. Implementation of some of these recommendations may be difficult, at best, based upon the politics. But, unless we are willing to think "out of the box," we will never really be able to structure the military to meet the nation's needs.

#### Federalized Force and State Militia

It is time for Congress to make the tough and politically sensitive decision to eliminate the three Army components and make them into one seamless federalized force, the Total Force. This federal force would consist of an active component with one supporting reserve under the command and control of a single entity. Under this single command and control, bickering over budgets, force structure and equipment would be eliminated. State Adjutant Generals and Component Chiefs would be eliminated. Force structure could then be tailored to the actual needs of the Commander's in Chief (CINC's), and the Army Chief of Staff would have a clear say in setting priorities for manning, equipping and resourcing the Total Force, as well as, publishing one set of regulations.

The individual states could create state militia's, if they so chose, as provided in the Constitution; however, funding would remain the state's responsibility. The time has long past for individual states to have military forces and assets funded by the federal government. Elimination of fifty-four Adjutant Generals Offices and the state military headquarters would save millions of dollars. In times of disaster, states could request federal forces to assist local efforts as part of the federal disaster relief effort. Law enforcement, though, would remain the domain of the state.

The end result would reduce duplication, streamline administration, and set into motion a new way of thinking within the service. The biggest obstacle would be state politicians and governors who fear the loss of vital resources and dollars. The biggest gains would be an efficient military and fewer wasted defense dollars. Dollars that could be used for Total Force modernization and Total Force training.

Is such a plan doable? Yes. Is it realistic to expect Congress to make such a decision?

Yes. However, the probability is remote given the political sensitivities. None the less,

Congress must be forced to consider restructuring such as this in order to have an efficient military for the 21st Century.

#### Active and Reserve Unit Integration

Active component involvement in day-to-day training of reserve units and soldiers is vital to ensure that reserve units are prepared for their active mission in wartime. The active component must be involved in establishing METL tasks based upon the wartime mission, prioritizing training time, prioritizing training resources, and in the overall readiness evaluation

process. In short, the receiving active duty wartime commander must have a stake in the reserve unit he will receive upon mobilization.

This involvement was supposed to be integrated in the CAPSTONE program, now called WARTRACE. It was based partly upon the theory of battle focus. However, CAPSTONE did not work for a host of reasons, and the WARTRACE program is already off to a shaky start. Without adequate guidance form wartime commanders, "the reserve commander [attempts] to drink from the fire hose [to] accomplish all of his Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) tasks, or he assume[s] a wartime mission." In either case, he is destine to fail.

Likewise, during annual training periods, active/reserve integration is critical. Reserve units must train and participate in exercises with their active duty counterparts. Combat support and combat service support units could assume responsibility for specific missions or on-going support functions. Standard operating procedures could be exercised and lines of communication reinforced, so that upon mobilization, a seamless assimilation could occur. It would also create greater trust and confidence between both active and reserve commanders, and provide a clear focus for critical reserve training.

#### Restructured Training Time

The current standard two-day monthly weekend drill and two-week annual training period must be changed, primarily because the weekend training assembly is an inefficient use of time. Extended active duty periods are needed. One suggestion is the two-by-two<sup>47</sup> approach whereby a reserve unit would attend two two-week annual training periods per year with no monthly weekend drills. This would allow for a clear focus on training with a greater

potential for active component involvement. One two-week period could be used for training and schooling, and the second could be used for participation in exercises or real world support. Although the total training time would be reduced to thirty days per year, the real training time would be greatly increased. The cost savings for personnel mandays would be used for increased transportation and site support. Unfortunately, this suggestion has met with a number of negatives; namely, reserve commanders would lose control for six months between annual training periods allowing skill decay and problems with unit cohesion; employers would object or refuse additional time away from civilian jobs, or force employees to use vacation time; personnel turbulence could not be monitored as effectively, leaving reserve leaders without monthly enforcement; and a greater reliance on full time support would be required. Although, there is a lot of truth to these negatives; they are not insurmountable obstacles—employer incentives and innovative ways could be used to bridge the gap. The fact still remains—the weekend training assembly must be changed to provide for a more efficient use of training time.

#### **Active Guard and Reserve**

Assuming as I do that the AGR force is necessary, the AGR soldier should be rotated between active and reserve component assignments. This would give the AGR soldier the necessary real world branch or functional area exposure to both training and operations. Likewise, active component soldiers should continue to be assigned to reserve units for cross fertilization of ideas and for their training expertise. However, the concept of active component soldiers as reserve advisors is counterproductive, as this sets the stage for inter-component rivalry. AGR soldiers already attend resident courses with their active counterparts, but more often than not, lack the experience to make maximum utilization of the resident course instruction. With active component rotations, the AGR soldier would be in a much better

position to bring back the real world training and operations experience that is lacking in the many reserve units. Additionally, because the AGR soldier is a reservists, their imput will be more readily accepted as their background is rooted in the reserve components.

#### **Operational Support**

One initiative that Secretary of Defense William Perry suggested bares a closer look-operational support. This involves "changing the paradigm from training for the sake of training—to operational support, with training as a by-product." The goal of Secretary Perry was to maximize the Reserve contribution to the Total Force, while relieving some of the pressure on active duty personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). The idea was to utilize reserve units for special projects that were priorities of the services and of geographic CINC's. The reserve unit, already funded for 15 days of annual training, would work on a specific project that active personnel could not accomplish due to real world missions. Assuming that these projects provide METL task training and individual skill development, the benefits would accrue not only to the CINC, but also to the services and the reserve unit and soldiers. Initial response from the CINC's was overwhelming with over 600 projects identified.<sup>48</sup>

Not only does this idea ease PERSTEMPO, but it fosters the active/reserve relationship discussed earlier. Additionally, it provides real world training opportunities for the reserve unit, and gives the CINC the opportunity to observe and develop relationships with a unit assigned to him in wartime. This is clearly a win-win situation for all. For FY 96 and FY 97, Secretary Perry has already set aside \$25 million per year, with matching money from the services and CINC's, to accomplish such projects as maintenance support to the equipment maintenance center in the European Command.<sup>49</sup>

#### Equipment

Greater emphasis must be put on the equipment needs of the Reserves. Services can no longer buy "what is needed for the active component and treat the needs of the Reserves as an afterthought." Nor can they merely redistribute the equipment from the active component that is obsolete. The Reserves must have access to the most advanced equipment available for training, familiarization and for maintenance, or they will be a liability when called to active duty. The Reserve procurement dollars are a step in the right direction, but separate procurement accounts continue to foster inter-component rivalry, and pork barrel politics continues to force procurements of unessential equipment. More creative ways must be found for reserve units to gain access to critical equipment, such as the "shared truck" concept suggested by the Chief of Transportation. In this concept, a reserve and active duty transportation company collocated on an active installation would share truck assets.

Recognizing that a reserve unit cannot train without its equipment, and that a reserve unit cannot maintain a full complement of equipment, the Army instituted the Minimum Essential Equipment for Training (MEET) Program. This program was supposed to ensure that reserve units have sufficient equipment with which to train. However, "the program has been implemented haphazardly," and does not address how reserve units can train effectively when key equipment is located at distant active Army installations. Nor does it address how a field artillery battalion, without secure communication equipment, can effectively train to be integrated into an active division upon mobilization. Consequently, more attention needs to be paid to reserve stationing, especially as it relates to units with critical equipment that must be kept on active installations. Additionally, greater command emphasis is needed when deciding what kind and how much equipment will be placed into reserve equipment concentration sites or at mobilization stations.

#### Training of Personnel

In today's reserve, as was mentioned earlier, the norm is for officers and enlisted to have multiple branches or skills. It is also the norm for these soldiers to be retrained in their new area by attending USAR short course schools taught by reserve instructors on drill weekends, or by enrolling in correspondence courses. This is also the norm for officers attending Command and General Staff College courses. In either case, this is a poor second choice to attending active duty schools. One recommendation is for active duty instructors to teach these courses to ensure that a standardized up-to-date curriculum is taught. It is obviously more cost effective to bring in one or two active duty instructors than for a dozen or so reservists to attend the active duty school.

A second recommendation is to utilize the concept of distance learning. This concept utilizes computer technology by making a high-quality standardized course of instruction available through modem interface to a geographically dispersed population. This program will allow for interaction between active duty instructor and student, and provide flexibility for personnel with time and distance problems. According to Deborah Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, this "could well be a silver bullet for military training in the future, if [it] is leveraged properly."<sup>52</sup>

In either case, it is imperative that reserve soldiers get the best training possible, and it is equally imperative that new and creative ways be utilized to bring a quality, standardized program to the reservist. Without this quality training, our reserve soldiers will be ill prepared, especially as more and more weapons systems become technologically advanced.

#### **Summary of Recommendations**

Throughout these recommendations, there are several recurring themes. First, the three component Army is counterproductive to a Total Force Policy. Second, active component leadership and involvement in training and evaluation is essential to ensure a combat ready reserve force. And third, reserve forces can no longer be considered second class soldiers; they deserve the best equipment, training and leadership equal to that of the active component. To have anything less, will create a reserve component incapable of supporting the active forces in war and peacetime operations.

Although, many will argue that some of these recommendations are unrealistic given current political realities; it is also unrealistic to expect a reserve force to be mobilization ready when wartime tactical headquarters have little or no say in training. It is time to put politics aside, and create a reserve force compatible to the needs of the Total Force Policy.

#### CHAPTER 4

#### CONCLUSION

Throughout this paper, we have presented arguments to demonstrate that the current Total Force Policy is flawed in how it is implemented with respect to the reserve components. We have argued that the problems of archaic command and control structures, lack of active component involvement in training, leadership, and lack of equipment has degraded overall reserve readiness. The recommendations presented, although not totally inclusive of all possible recommendations, will go a long way to increasing the effectiveness of the Reserves.

The problem of how to implement these recommendations still exists. Political realities and budget constraints will probably prevent their implementation. However, change is inevitable, and unless we step out of the box and shift our paradigm, we will never achieve a viable organization. The Reserves are composed of some of the most dedicated citizens in our country, who are willing to sacrifice careers, family, time and their lives for this country. If we are not willing to critically examine our organization and make necessary changes, someone or something else will force it upon us. We owe it to our Nation and our soldiers to act now.

Action, though, requires a new frame of reference—the Total Force. It requires total commitment and a new way of doing business. In the past twenty-five years since the Total Force concept was initiated, we have not given it a total commitment. We have paid lip service to this concept when it was politically correct. Now, we are once again at a crisis point, but will we make this leap? Or, will we continue to pay lip service?

#### NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Harry G. Summers, Jr., <u>On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War</u> (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), 10-11.
- <sup>2</sup> National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988/1989, House Report 100-58, 100th Congress, 1st Session (Government Printing Office, 1987), 186.
- <sup>3</sup> Jeffrey Jacobs, <u>The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues and Answers</u>, (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 7.
  - <sup>4</sup> Ibid., 4.
  - <sup>5</sup> Ibid., 27.
  - <sup>6</sup> Ibid., 1.
  - <sup>7</sup> Ibid., 67.
  - <sup>8</sup> Ibid., 4.
- <sup>9</sup> The United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) is the national Army Reserve Command responsible for commanding the ten Regional Support Commands and ten General Officer Commands.
  - <sup>10</sup> The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force, 60.
- General Accounting Office, <u>Army Training</u>: <u>Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance Reservists' Training</u>, (Washington, DC, 1989), 20.
  - <sup>12</sup> Ibid., 36.
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, <u>Reserve Component Programs</u>: <u>Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1989</u> (Washington, DC, 1990), 80.
- <sup>14</sup> Major General Max Baratz, Chief, Army Reserve, "Nation Needs Reserve Force," in <u>The Officer</u>, February 1995, 40.
  - <sup>15</sup> The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force, 59.
  - <sup>16</sup> Ibid., 55.
- <sup>17</sup> MG John L. Matthews, "Assessing Reserve Component Training," <u>Military Review</u>, November 1989, 27-33.
  - <sup>18</sup> The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force, 83-84.
  - <sup>19</sup> "Assessing Reserve Component Training," 32.

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- <sup>20</sup> Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1989, 68.
- <sup>21</sup> General Accounting Office, <u>National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War</u> (Washington, DC, 1991), 13.
- <sup>22</sup> Barton Gellman, "Cheney Says Guard Units May Need Reorganization," <u>Washington Post</u>, March 15, 1991, A34.
- <sup>23</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, <u>Reserve Component Programs</u>: <u>Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1991</u> (Washington, DC, 1992), 51.
  - <sup>24</sup> The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force, 122.
  - <sup>25</sup> Ibid., 69.
- <sup>26</sup> US Army Training Board, <u>Training and Organization of the Reserve Components: A Reference Text for Total Force Trainers, 1987-88</u> (Fort Monroe, VA, 1988), 4.
- <sup>27</sup> Captain German J. Velez, "48 Hours: Fighting the Reserve Component Battle," Infantry, November-December 1989, 17.
  - <sup>28</sup> The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force, 70.
- LANES training focuses small unit size elements, platoon and below, on specific METL technical training in a tactical environment. Leaders are taught how to negotiate the lane prior to execution. Cells continue to repeat the tasks until the standard is reached. Evaluators provide constructive feedback, and after action reviews involve the entire cell in structured learning.
- Reserve units are prioritized based upon their priority for mobilization. Units that have a mobilization schedule of less than 30 days are identified as Force Support Package (FSP) units, formerly called Contingency Force Pool (CFP), and receive priority in funding over non FSP units. This priority is called tiered resourcing.
- Major General Herbert Koger, Jr., "Reorganization, Consolidation Improve Force," The Officer, February 1996, 69.
- Readiness levels range from C-1 to C-5 with C-1 equating to 14 days or less to be fully trained, C-2 15-28 days, C-3 29-42 days and C-4 more than 42 days. C-4 is considered to be below standard and not mission deployable. A C-5 rating is given only to units that are undergoing significant reorganization. Source: Government Accounting Office, <u>Army Training: Evaluations of Unit's Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable</u>, (Washington, DC, 1991).
  - 33 Based upon personal experience in the 86th USARCOM during FY 95.
- <sup>34</sup> Lieutenant General James W. Crystel, speech delivered at Columbia, S.C., January 1991 and cited in The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force, 90.

#### **NOTES**

- <sup>35</sup> The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force, 91.
- <sup>36</sup> Congressional Budget Office, <u>Improving the Army Reserves</u>, November 1985, 16.
- <sup>37</sup> Based upon personal experience in the 86th USARCOM during FY 95.
- <sup>38</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, <u>Reserve Component Programs—FY 1992:</u> Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, (Washington, DC, 1993), 101.
- <sup>39</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, <u>Reserve Component Programs--FY 1994: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board</u>, (Washington, DC, 1995), 93.
  - 40 Ibid., 94.
  - <sup>41</sup> Ibid., 95.
  - <sup>42</sup> Ibid., 99.
  - 43 Ibid., xii.
  - 44 "Nation Needs Reserve Force," 42.
- <sup>45</sup> Battle focus is an approach used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. It guides planning, execution and assessment of each organizations training program to ensure the unit trains as it will fight.
  - <sup>46</sup> The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force, 113.
  - <sup>47</sup> Ibid., 126.
- <sup>48</sup> Deborah R. Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, "25 Years of Total Force," in <u>The Officer</u>, February 1996, 40.
  - 49 Ibid.
  - <sup>50</sup> Ibid., 42.
- <sup>51</sup> General Accounting Office, <u>Army Reserve Components: Minimum Essential</u> <u>Equipment for Training Has Not Been Effectively Managed</u>, (Washington, DC, 1990), 6.
  - <sup>52</sup> "25 Years of Total Force," 42.

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